I then give two responses to the challenge, both of which appeal to intentional modes. ) cases of cross-modal perception, threatening representationalism about consciousness in general. ( shrink)īayne and McClelland (2016) raise the matching content challenge for proponents of cognitive phenomenology: if the phenomenal character of thought is determined by its intentional content, why is it that my conscious thought that there is a blue wall before me and my visual perception of a blue wall before me don’t share any phenomenology, despite their matching content? In this paper, I first show that the matching content challenge is not limited to proponents of cognitive phenomenology but extends to (. Seeing where and how such transfer succeeds and fails in individual cases has much to offer to our understanding of perception and its modalities. Some integrative data-processes transfer across modalities others do not. After proposing a generalized formulation of MQ, we extend earlier work (“Many Molyneux Questions,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2020) by showing that MQ does not admit a single answer across the board. We further emphasize that MQ targets general ideas so as to distinguish it from corresponding questions about experiences of shape and about the property of tangible (vs. ) beyond question (a), about spatial locations, alone for a positive answer to (a) leaves open whether a perceiver might cross-identify locations, but not be able to identify the shapes that collections of locations comprise. Posed this way, Molyneux’s Question goes substantially (. To answer it, we must ask (a) whether spatial locations identified by touch can be identified also by sight, and (b) whether the integration of spatial locations into an idea of shape persists through changes of modality. This, we contend, is a question about general ideas. Molyneux asked whether a newly sighted person could distinguish a sphere from a cube by sight alone, given that she was antecedently able to do so by touch. One upshot of this argument is that Conservatives who claim that the Liberal view intolerably broadens the scope of perceptual illusions, particularly from the perspective of perceptual psychology, should pursue other arguments against that view. I conclude that the McGurk effect and the ventriloquist effect are both explicable without the postulation of high-level content, but that at least one multimodal experimental paradigm may necessitate such content: the rubber hand illusion. The second is to explore whether any experimental studies of multimodal perception support a so-called Liberal (or ‘high-level’ or ‘rich’) account of perception’s admissible contents. ) contents debate into a multimodal framework, charting its various significances. I thus have two aims: first, to motivate a reorientation of the admissible (. I argue that this constitutes an improvement over the armchair methodology constitutive of phenomenal contrast cases, but that there is a crucial respect in which current empirical procedures remain limited: they are unimodal in nature, wrongly treating the senses as isolatable faculties. Thus, considering feelings as part of the perception system.What is the correct procedure for determining the contents of perception? Philosophers tackling this question increasingly rely on empirically-oriented procedures in order to reach an answer. This association indicates that perception in Kirundi gets information from both internal and external stimuli. kwûmva inzara ‘lit: hear hunger’, kwûmva umunêzēro ‘lit: hear happiness’). However, in collocations involving emotion words, it connects perception to emotion (e.g. kwûmva akamōto ‘lit:hear a smell’/ururírīmbo ruryōshé ‘lit: a tasty song’/ururirimbo ruhimbâye ‘lit: a pleasant song). Moreover, the auditory experience verb kwûmva ‘hear’ shows that lower senses can extend to higher senses through the use of synaesthetic metaphor (e.g. The attested multisensory expression of auditory verb kwûmva ‘hear’ allows us to reduce sense modalities to two –vision and audition. For Kirundi, findings from a corpus-based analysis revealed a cross-modal polysemy and a bidirectional hierarchy between higher and lower senses. A word from one sense can metaphorically express another physical perception meaning. Languages do not always use specific perception words to refer to specific senses.
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